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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks, like many other machine learning
models, have recently been shown to lack robustness against
adversarially crafted inputs. These inputs are derived from
regular inputs by minor yet carefully selected perturbations
that deceive machine learning models into desired misclas-
sifications. Existing work in this emerging field was largely
specific to the domain of image classification, since the high-
entropy of images can be conveniently manipulated without
changing the images’ overall visual appearance. Yet, it re-
mains unclear how such attacks translate to more security-
sensitive applications such as malware detection–which may
pose significant challenges in sample generation and ar-
guably grave consequences for failure.
In this paper, we show how to construct highly-effective
adversarial sample crafting attacks for neural networks used
as malware classifiers. The application domain of malware
classification introduces additional constraints in the adver-
sarial sample crafting problem when compared to the com-
puter vision domain: (i) continuous, differentiable input do-
mains are replaced by discrete, often binary inputs; and (ii)
the loose condition of leaving visual appearance unchanged
is replaced by requiring equivalent functional behavior. We
demonstrate the feasibility of these attacks on many differ-
ent instances of malware classifiers that we trained using the
DREBIN Android malware data set. We furthermore evalu-
ate to which extent potential defensive mechanisms against
adversarial crafting can be leveraged to the setting of mal-
ware classification. While feature reduction did not prove
to have a positive impact, distillation and re-training on ad-
versarially crafted samples show promising results.
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks transformed the way machine learn-
ing solve computational tasks that rely on high-dimensional
data. Examples include dominating Go [20], handling auto-
nomous cars [3] and classifying images at a large scale [12].
Neural networks exhibit particularly outstanding results in
settings that involve large amounts of data. They have also
been shown to have the capacity of extracting increasingly
complex data representations. Hence it is sound to consider
the hypothetical application of neural networks to security-
critical domains such as malware classification.
While the benefits of neural networks are undisputed, re-
cent work has shown that like many machine learning mod-
els, they lack robustness against adversarially crafted inputs.
These inputs are derived from regular inputs by minor yet
carefully selected perturbations [7, 17] that induce models
into adversary-desired misclassifications. The vast major-
ity of work in this emerging field is specific to the domain
of image classification. Images have high entropy and can
be conveniently manipulated by changing individual pixels
on a real and continuous scale. Changes applied are often
hardly visible to our eyes. The approach that conceptually
underlies many recent adversarial machine learning research
effort involves gradients of the function F represented by the
learned model (e.g., a neural network, logistic regression,
nearest neighbor ...) in order to classify inputs: evaluating
it on an input X, one can quickly (and fully automatically)
either identify individual input features that should be per-
turbed iteratively to achieve misclassification [17] or com-
pute a suitable minor change for each pixel all at once [7].
Adversarially crafted inputs can hence be used for sub-
verting systems that rely on image classification. An ex-
ample is decision making for autonomous vehicles, which
might pose security threats in certain situations. However,
verifying whether adversarial crafting is also applicable to
inherently security-critical domains that differ significantly
in terms of input type and set of possible valid perturbations
remains largely an open problem. Adversarial crafting for
malware detection, for example, would arguably entail much
more severe consequences. But it also raises challenges not
encountered in the previously well-studied setting of com-
puter vision: inputs have significantly less entropy. They
are usually not represented on a continuous scale of real
numbers, but as binary values—an application either uses a
certain system call or not. Moreover, approaches perturbing
a given application are considered valid only if they do not
modify or jeopardize the application functionality. This was
a significantly easier task in computer vision settings where
this condition was replaced by requiring indistinguishability
of images for a human observer (technically: minimizing the
distance between the adversarial original images).
Contributions.
In this paper we show how to successfully perform adver-
sarial crafting attacks on neural networks for malware clas-
sification. We employ feed forward neural networks, achiev-
ing state-of-the-art performance in detecting malware on the
DREBIN data set [1]. To craft adversarial samples, we fol-
low the method originally proposed by Papernot et al. [17],
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but address challenges that appear in the transition from
continuous and differentiable input domains in computer vi-
sion to discrete and restricted inputs in malware detection.
Since to the best of our knowledge there is no mature and
publicly available malware detection system that uses neural
networks, we develop our own classifier. We train and eval-
uate it on the DREBIN dataset introduced by Arp et al. [1],
which contains more than 120,000 android applications sam-
ples, among them over 5,000 malware samples. All features
were extracted using static analysis on the given applica-
tion. Our classifier achieves up to 97% accuracy with 7.6%
false negatives and 2% false positives, despite minimal effort
for hyperparameter selection. This matches state of the art
malware detection systems that rely on static features.
To generate the adversarial samples, we adapt an algo-
rithm based on the forward derivative of the attacked neu-
ral network, originally presented by Papernot et al. [17].
We address additional constraints that appear in malware
detection: A) We can only fully add or remove features,
but not gradually change them. This contrasts to previous
applications of adversarial crafting in computer vision. B)
We must preserve the utility of the modified application,
which we achieve by only adding features, and only those
that do not interfere with the functionality of the applica-
tion. C) We can only add a restricted amount of features.
To simplify matters, we therefore decide to only add entries
to the AndroidManifest.xml file. This file is contained in
the APK (the android application package) of the android
application that contains the application’s code and that is
used to distribute the application to the end user. Despite
these restrictions, we achieve up to a 85% misclassification
rate on malicious applications. We thus validate that adver-
sarial crafting is indeed viable in security critical domains
such as malware detection: neural networks should not be
used in such domains without taking precautions for hard-
ening them against adversarial crafting.
As a second contribution, we investigate potential meth-
ods for hardening neural network based malware detec-
tion systems against adversarial crafting: by applying these
mechanisms we aim at reducing the sensitivity of networks
to adversarial manipulations of their inputs, and thus in-
crease their resilience to adversarial crafting. We first look
at the impact of feature reduction on the the network’s sen-
sitivity to adversarial crafting. In a second step we then
consider distillation [18] and re-training on adversarial sam-
ples [21] which have both been proposed as actual defen-
sive mechanisms in the literature. The findings of our ex-
perimental evaluation of the aforementioned mechanisms is
threefold. First, feature reduction does not protect against
adversarial crafting. It can even have adverse effects in that
it further simplifies crafting adversarial samples. Second,
using distillation reduces the misclassification rates, but the
range of improvement is rather small. And third, re-training
on adversarially crafted samples improves the resistance of
most neural networks, however the parameter choice for re-
training has a noticeable impact.
Our findings show that adversarially crafted inputs pose
a threat in security-critical domains where the behavior of
unknown programs is being analyzed and classified.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we explain the general concepts used in this
paper. We first briefly cover background on neural networks
and in some detail how to craft adversarial samples.
2.1 Neural Networks
Neural Networks are machine learning models capable of
solving a variety of tasks ranging from classification [12, 4] to
regression [15] and dimensionality reduction [11]. They use
a graph of elementary computing units—named neurons—
organized in layers linked to each other to learn models.
Each neuron applies an activation function, often non-linear,
to its input to produce an output. Figure 1, taken from [17],
illustrates the general structure of such neural neutworks
and also introduces the notation that is used throughout
the paper.
Starting with the model input, each network layer pro-
duces an output used as an input by the next layer. Net-
works with a single intermediate—hidden—layer are quali-
fied as shallow neural networks whereas models with mul-
tiple hidden layers are deep neural networks. Using multi-
ple hidden layers is interpreted as hierarchically extracting
representations from the input [6], eventually producing a
representation relevant to solve the machine learning task
and output a prediction.
A neural network model F can be formalized as the com-
position of multi-dimensional and parametrized functions fi
each corresponding to a layer of the network architecture—
and a representation of the input:
F : ~x 7→ fn(...f2(f1(~x, θ1), θ2)..., θn) (1)
where each vector θi parametrizes layer i of the network F
and includes weights for the links connecting layer i to layer
i−1. The set of model parameters θ = {θi} is learned during
training. For instance, in supervised settings, parameter
values are fixed by computing prediction errors f(x)− ~y on
a collection of known input-output pairs (~x, ~y).
2.2 Adversarial Machine Learning
Neural networks, like numerous machine learning models,
have been shown to be vulnerable to manipulations of their
inputs [21]. These manipulations take the form of adver-
sarial samples, inputs crafted by adding carefully selected
and often humanly indistinguishable perturbations to inputs
so as to force a targeted model to misclassify the sample.
These samples exploit imperfections in the training phase
as well as the underlying linearity of components used to
learn models—even if the overall model is non-linear like is
the case for deep neural networks [7]. The space of adver-
saries was formalized for multi-class deep learning classifiers
in a taxonomy [17]. Adversarial goals can vary from sim-
ple misclassification of the input in a class different from
the legitimate source class to source-target misclassification
where samples from any source class are to be misclassified
in a chosen target class. Adversaries can also be taxono-
mized by the knowledge of the targeted model they must
possess to perform their attacks.
In this paper, we study a binary classifier with only
two output classes. Crafting an adversarial sample ~x∗—
misclassified by model F—from a legitimate sample ~x can
be formalized as the following problem [21]:
~x∗ = ~x+ δ~x = ~x+ min ‖~z‖ s.t. F(~x+ ~z) 6= F(~x) (2)
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Notations
F: function learned by neural network during training
X: input of neural network
Y: output of neural network
M: input dimension (number of neurons on input layer)
N: output dimension (number of neurons on output layer)
n: number of hidden layers in neural network
f: activation function of a neuron
      : output vector of layer k neurons
Indices
k: index for layers (between 0 and n+1)
i: index for input X component (between 0 and N)
j: index for output Y component (between 0 and M)
p: index for neurons (between 0 and       for any layer k)X Yn hidden layers
m1
m2
mn
Hk
mk
Figure 1: The structure of deep feed-forward neural networks, via Papernot et al. [17]
where δ~x is the minimal perturbation ~z yielding misclassifi-
cation, according to a norm ‖ · ‖ appropriate for the input
domain. Due to the non-linearity and non-convexity of mod-
els learned by deep neural networks, a closed form solution to
this problem is hard to find. Thus, algorithms were proposed
to select perturbations approximatively minimizing the op-
timization problem stated in Equation 2. The fast gradient
sign method introduced by Goodfellow et al. [7] linearizes
the model’s cost function around the input to be perturbed
and selects a perturbation by differentiating this cost func-
tion with respect to the input itself and not the network pa-
rameters like is traditionally the case during training. The
forward derivative based approach introduced by Papernot
et al. [17] evaluates the model’s output sensitivity to each
input component using its Jacobian matrix JF =
[
∂Fj
∂xi
]
. A
perturbation is then selected with adversarial saliency maps,
which rank each input component’s contribution to the ad-
versarial goal by combining components of matrix JF. Both
the fast gradient sign and forward derivative methods re-
quire full knowledge of the targeted model’s architecture and
parameters. However, a black-box attack leveraging both of
these approaches to target unknown remotely hosted deep
neural networks was proposed in [16]. It first approximates
the targeted model by querying it for output labels to train
a substitute model, which is then used to craft adversarial
samples also misclassified by the originally targeted model.
Machine learning models deployed in adversarial settings
therefore need to be robust to manipulations of their in-
puts [14]. Solutions were proposed to improve the train-
ing algorithms used for deep neural networks, yielding mod-
els more robust to such perturbations. Goodfellow et al.
demonstrated that explicitly training with adversarial sam-
ples reduced the error rate of models on samples crafted
against the resulting improved model [7]. Papernot et al.
proposed the use of distillation—training with class proba-
bilities produced by a teacher model instead of labels—as a
defense mechanism, and showed that this effectively reduces
the sensitivity of models to small perturbations [18]. Warde-
Farley et al. [22] evaluated a simplified variant of distilla-
tion training models on softened indicator vectors instead of
probabilities. They showed error rates reductions on sam-
ples crafted using the fast gradient sign method. These solu-
tions however do not completely prevent misclassification of
adversarial samples, which thus remains an open-problem.
3. METHODOLOGY
This section describes the approach to adversarial crafting
for malware detection. We start by describing how we rep-
resent applications for the classification, and how we train
the classifiers, detailing which configurations we choose for
the neural networks. Thereafter, we describe in detail how
we craft adversarial samples based on the forward derivative
of the trained neural network, and detail the restrictions on
crafting adversarial samples for malware detection (we only
add features to ensure functionality is preserved).
3.1 Application Model
Before we can start training a neural network based mal-
ware detection system, we first have to decide on a repre-
sentation of applications that we use as input to our classi-
fier. In this work, we focus on statically determined features
of applications. As a feature, we understand some prop-
erty that the statically evaluated code of the application
exhibits. This includes for instance whether the application
uses a specific system call or not, as well as a usage of specific
hardware components or access to the Internet.
A natural way to represent such features is using binary
indicator vectors: Given features 1, . . . ,M , we represent an
application using the binary vector X ∈ {0, 1}M , where
Xi indicate whether the application exhibits feature i, i.e.
Xi = 1, or not, i.e. Xi = 0. Due to the varied nature of ap-
plications that are available, M will typically be very large,
while each single application only exhibits very few features.
This leads to very sparse feature vectors, and overall, a
very sparsely populated space of applications in which we
try to successfully separate malicious from benign applica-
tions. Neural networks have shown to be very successful at
separating classes in sparse populated domains. Hence, we
will use them to build our malware detection system.
3.2 Training the Malware Classifier
To the best of our knowledge, there is no publicly available
malware detection system based on neural networks that
considers static features. While Dahl et al. [5] use a neural
networks to classify malware, their approach uses random
projections and considers dynamic data. Since perturbing
dynamically gathered features is a lot more challenging than
modifying static features, we stick to the simpler, static case
in this work and leave the dynamic case for future work.
3
Convolutional neural networks are common architectures
for computer vision tasks, and recurrent neural networks
for natural language processing and hand-writing recogni-
tion. These architectures, however, take advantage of special
properties of their input domains to improve their classifi-
cation performance. On the one hand, convolutional neural
networks work well on input containing translation invariant
properties, which can be found in images [13]. Recurrent
neural networks, on the other hand, work well with input
data that needs to be processed sequentially [8].
The binary indicator vector X we use to represent an ap-
plication does not possess any of the above structural prop-
erties. We therefore stick to regular, feed-forward neural
networks as described in Section 2 to solve our malware
classification task. Regular feed-forward neural networks
are known to not work as well on established use cases as
the structured networks mentioned above. However the ab-
sence of such structures in our input domain only leaves
unstructured feed-forward neural networks. As we will see
in Section 4, these work well enough for our use case.
We train several classifiers using varying configurations:
while each network takes the same binary indicator vector X
as input, they differ in the amount of hidden layers (between
one and four). Furthermore, we also vary the amount of
neurons per layer, ranging between 10 and 300.
We use the rectified non-linearity as the activation func-
tion for each hidden neuron in our network, i.e.
∀p ∈ [1,mk] : fk,p(x) = max(0, x)
with
x =
mk−1∑
j=1
wj,p · xj + bj,p,
where the weight wj,p and the bias bj,p are trained values.
After the final hidden layer, we use a softmax layer to nor-
malize the output of the network to a probability distribu-
tion, i.e. the output of the network is computed by
Fi(X) =
exi
ex0 + ex1
, xi =
mn∑
j=1
wj,i · xj + bj,i (3)
To train our network, we use standard gradient descent with
batches of size 1000 that are split into training and valida-
tion sets, using 10 training epochs per iteration. The perfor-
mance of the thus trained network is hugely influenced by
the choice of the gradient descent hyperparameters: these
parameters are not trained, but set at the beginning to con-
trol the behavior of the gradient descent algorithm. Usually,
a large of effort is put toward finding the ideal hyperparam-
eters for a given use case. In our case, we choose these
hyperparameters based on previous experience and do not
perform an exhaustive search for ideal hyperparameters. For
instance, we choose a dropout of 50% between each hidden
layer avoid over-fitting, i.e. the output of 50% of all neu-
rons in each layer is ignored and set to 0. As we will see
in the evaluation, we still achieve acceptable performance
results. However, we expect that the classification perfor-
mance could be greatly increased by putting more effort into
the selection of these hyperparameters.
Since the DREBIN dataset that we use for our evalua-
tions (cf. Section 4) has a fairly unbalanced ratio between
malware and benign applications, we experiment with differ-
ent ratios of malware in each training batch to compare the
Algorithm 1 Crafting Adversarial Samples for Mal-
ware Detection
Input: x, y, F, k, I
1: x∗ ← x
2: Γ = {1 . . . |x|}
3: while argmaxj Fj(x
∗) 6= y and ||δX|| < k do
4: Compute forward derivative ∇F(x∗)
5: imax = argmaxj∈Γ∩I,Xj=0
∂Fy(X)
∂Xj
6: if imax ≤ 0 then
7: return Failure
8: end if
9: x∗imax = 1
10: δx ← x∗ − x
11: end while
12: return x∗
achieved performance values. The number of training itera-
tions is then set in such a way that all malware samples are at
least used once. We evaluate the classification performance
of each of these networks using accuracy, false negative and
false positive rates as performance measures. Afterwards,
we evaluate the best performing networks against the ad-
versarial crafting attack we discuss next.
3.3 Crafting Adversarial Malware Samples
The goal of adversarial sample crafting in malware detec-
tion is to mislead the detection system, causing the classi-
fication for a particular application to change according to
the attackers wishes.
Describing more formally, we start with X ∈ {0, 1}m, a
binary indicator vector that indicates which features are
present in an application. Given X, the classifier F re-
turns a two dimensional vector F(X) = [F0(X),F1(X)] with
F0(X) + F1(X) = 1 that encodes the classifiers belief that
X is either benign (F0(X)) or malicious (F1(X)). We take
as the classification result y the option that has the higher
probability, i.e. y = argmaxi Fi(X). The goal of adversarial
sample crafting now is to find a small perturbation δ such
that the classification results y′ of F(X+δ) is different from
the original results, i.e. y′ 6= y. We denote y′ as our target
class in the adversarial crafting process.
Our goal is to have a malicious application classified as
benign, i.e. given a malicious input X, we want a classifi-
cation results y′ = 0. The opposite case is to misclassify
a benign application as malicious. While this is also pos-
sible, we assume that the perturbation of the application
will be performed by the original author of this application.
Since an honest author has no interest in having his benign
application classified as malware, we ignore this case.
We adopt the adversarial crafting algorithm based on the
jacobian matrix
JF =
∂F(X)
∂X
=
[
∂Fi(X)
∂Xj
]
i∈0,1,j∈[1,m]
of the neural network F put forward by Papernot et al. [17]
and which we already discussed in Section 2. Despite it orig-
inally being defined for images, we show that an adaptation
to a different domain is fairly straight forward.
To craft an adversarial sample, we take mainly two steps.
In the first, we compute the gradient of F with respect to X
to estimate the direction in which a perturbation in X would
change F’s output. In the second step, we choose a pertur-
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bation δ of X with maximal positive gradient into our target
class y′. For malware misclassification, this means that we
choose the index i = argmaxj∈[1,m],Xj=0 F0(Xj) that max-
imizes the change into our target class 0 by changing Xi.
Note that we only consider positive changes for positions j
at which Xj = 0, which correspond to adding features the
application represented by X (since X is a binary indicator
vector). We discuss this choice in Section 3.4.
Ideally, we keep this change small to make sure that we
do not cause a negative change of F due to intermediate
changes of the gradient. For computer vision, this is not
an issue since the values of pixels are continuous and can
be changes in very small steps. In the malware detection
case, however, we do not have continuous data, but rather
discrete input values: since X ∈ 0, 1m is a binary indicator
vector, our only option is to increase one component in X
by exactly 1 to retain a valid input to F.
The adversarial sample crafting process is iterative: after
computing the gradient, we choose a feature whose gradient
is the largest for our target class and change it’s value in X
(i.e. by making corresponding changes to the application)
to obtain our new input vector X(1). We then recompute
the gradient under this new input X(1) and find the second
feature to change. We repeat this process until either a) we
reached the limit for maximum amount of allowed changes or
b) we successfully cause a misclassification. A pseudo-code
implementation of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. It
is largely similar to the algorithms presented in [17], with the
difference in the discrete changes of the input vector due to
the input domain and also the additional restrictions below.
3.4 Restrictions on Adversarial Crafting
To make sure that modifications caused by the above al-
gorithms do not change the application too much, we bound
the maximum distortion δ applied to the original sample. As
in the computer vision case, we only allow distortions δ with
‖δ‖ ≤ k. We differ, however, in the norm that we apply: in
computer vision, the L∞ norm is often used to bound the
maximum change. In our case, each modification to an entry
will always change its value by exactly 1, therefore making
the L∞ norm inappropriate. We instead use the L1 norm to
bound the overall number of features modified.
While the main goal of adversarial crafting is to achieve
misclassification, for malware detection, this cannot happen
at the cost of the application’s functionality: feature changes
determined by Algorithm 1 can cause the application in
question to lose its functionality in parts or completely. To
avoid this case, we adopt the following additional restrictions
on the adversarial crafting algorithm: we only add features,
and only add those that do not interfere with other features
already present in the application. This protects us from
unknowingly destroying the applications functionality. For-
mally, we encode the above restriction through the index set
I: it contains the indices corresponding to features that can
be added without affecting the applications functionality.
In Section 4, we show that we can successfully craft ad-
versarial samples despite these additional restrictions.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate the training of the neural network based mal-
ware detector and adversarial sample-induced misclassifica-
tion of inputs on it. Through our evaluation, we want to
validate the following two hypotheses: first, that the neu-
ID Name Manifest Code #
S1 Hardware Components X 4513
S2 Permissions X 3812
S3 Components X 218951
S4 Intents X 6379
S5 Restr. API Calls X 733
S6 Used Permissions X 70
S7 Susp. API Calls X 315
S8 Network Addresses X 310447
Table 1: Feature Types, where they are collected
and their cardinality.
1st Quantile Mean 3rd Quantile max
all 23 48 61 9661
malicious 35 62 83 666
Table 2: Some basic statistics on the number of fea-
tures per app in the DREBIN data set.
ral network based malware classifier achieves performance
comparable to state of the art malware classifiers (on static
features) presented in the literature. Second, the adversarial
sample crafting algorithm discussed in Section 3.3 allows us
to successfully mislead the neural network we trained. As
a measure of success, we consider the misclassification rate
achieved by the adversarial crafting algorithm. The mis-
classification rate is defined by the percentage of malware
samples that are misclassified after applying the adversarial
crafting algorithm, but were correctly classified before that.
4.1 Dataset
We base our evaluations on the DREBIN dataset, origi-
nally introduced by Arp et al. [1]: DREBIN contains 129.013
android applications, of which 123,453 are benign and 5,560
are malicious. Extracted static features are provided for all
applications. In total, the dataset contains 545,333 features
that are divided into 8 feature classes, each of which is repre-
sented by a binary value that indicates whether the feature
is present in an application or not. This directly translates
to the binary indicator vector X ∈ {0, 1}M used to represent
applications, with M = 545, 333.
The 8 feature classes in DREBIN cover various aspects of
android applications, including: A) Permissions and hard-
ware component access requested by each application (e.g.
for CAMERA or INTERNET access). B) Restricted and suspi-
cious (i.e. accessing sensitive data, e.g. getDeviceID())
API-calls made by the applications. C) application compo-
nents such activities, service, content provider and broadcast
receivers used by each applications, and D) intents used by
applications to communicate with other applications. Ta-
ble 1 lists each feature class and its cardinality.
In Table 2 we give average and quantile statistics on
the amount of features exhibited by the applications in
DREBIN. Given these numbers, we decide to set our dis-
tortion bound k = 20 – assuming we are modifying an ap-
plication of average size, it still remains within the two main
quartiles when adding at most 20 features.
Since the DREBIN data set contains Android applica-
tions, we decide to only add features that can be added
through modifications in the AndroidManifest.xml file of
the android application’s APK. The manifest is used by the
application to announces its components (i.e. its activi-
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Classifier MWR Accuracy FNR FPR
Arp et al. [1] − − 6.1 1
Sayfullina et al. [19] − − 0.1 17.9
[200] 0.4 97.83 8.06 1.86
[200] 0.5 95.85 5.41 4.06
[10, 10] 0.3 97.59 16.37 1.74
[10, 10] 0.4 94.85 9.68 4.90
[10, 10] 0.5 94.75 7.34 5.11
[10, 200] 0.3 97.53 11.21 2.04
[10, 200] 0.4 96.14 8.67 3.6
[10, 200] 0.5 94.26 5.72 5.71
[200, 10] 0.3 95.63 15.25 3.86
[200, 10] 0.4 93.95 10.81 5.82
[200, 10] 0.5 92.97 8.96 6.92
[50, 50] 0.3 96.57 12.57 2.98
[50, 50] 0.4 96.79 13.08 2.73
[50, 50] 0.5 93.82 6.76 6.11
[50, 200] 0.3 97.58 17.30 1.71
[50, 200] 0.4 97.35 10.14 2.29
[50, 200] 0.5 95.65 6.01 4.25
[200, 50] 0.3 96.89 6.37 2.94
[200, 50] 0.4 95.87 5.36 4.06
[200, 50] 0.5 93.93 4.55 6.12
[100, 200] 0.4 97.43 8.35 2.27
[200, 100] 0.4 97.32 9.23 2.35
[200, 100] 0.5 96.35 6.66 3.48
[200, 200] 0.1 98.92 17.18 0.32
[200, 200] 0.2 98.38 8.74 1.29
[200, 200] 0.3 98.35 9.73 1.29
[200, 200] 0.4 96.6 8.13 3.19
[200, 200] 0.5 95.93 6.37 3.96
[200, 300] 0.3 98.35 9.59 1.25
[200, 300] 0.4 97.62 8.74 2.05
[300, 200] 0.2 98.13 9.34 1.5
[300, 200] 0.4 97.29 8.06 2.43
[200, 200, 200] 0.1 98.91 17.48 0.31
[200, 200, 200] 0.4 97.69 10.34 1.91
[200, 200, 200, 200] 0.4 97.42 13.08 2.07
[200, 200, 200, 200] 0.5 97.5 12.37 2.01
Table 3: Performance of the classifiers. Given are
used malware ratio (MWR), accuracy, false negative
rate (FNR) and false positive rate (FPR).
ties, services, broadcast receivers, and content providers),
the permissions it requests and further information about
the application the system needs to run the application.
Changes in the manifest are particularly easy to implement,
since they only incur an additional line in the manifest and
do not cause any interference with the application’s func-
tionality. Changes to the code, on the other hand, would
require more effort and would have to be handled more care-
fully. Table 1 lists where each feature class in DREBIN orig-
inates from, identifying those features that originate in the
manifest and that we will consider in the adversarial craft-
ing algorithm. In Algorithm 1, we represent the set of valid
features for modification by the index set I.
4.2 Malware Detection
We train numerous neural network architecture variants,
according to the training procedure described in Section 3.
Our baseline architecture includes 2 hidden layers of 200
neurons each. From here, we vary the number of neurons
per layer (from 200 to 10, 50, 100 and 300), and the number
of layers (from 2 to 1, 3 and 4). We also vary the malware
ratio in each training batch by steps of 0.1 from 0.1 to 0.5
and measure its impact on the overall performance of the
neural network in correctly classifying the applications in
the DREBIN dataset.
The results for the different neural networks can be found
in Table 3. WE first list previous classifiers from the lit-
erature, then the architecture (in neurons per layer) that
we trained. As performance measures we consider the over-
all accuracy on the DREBIN dataset, as well as the false
positive and false negative rates.
Using the malware ratio in our training batches as a pa-
rameter to be optimized, we achieve false negative rates at
a level comparable to state of the art classifiers. This, how-
ever, happens at a trade-off with overall accuracy and false
positive rates. In comparison, Arp et al. [1] achieve a 6.1%
false negative rate at a 1% false positive rate. Sayfullina et
al. [19] even achieve a 0.1% false negative rate, however at
the cost of 17.9% false positives.
We can observe high accuracy (> 90%) across results.
The network architecture has some impact on the trade-off
between accuracy, false positive, and false negative rates at
the various malware ratios. However, no clear trends can
be observed that would indicate how many neurons should
be chosen on the first and second layer. Overall, the base-
line architecture with 200 neurons on 2 layers each achieves,
according to our experimental setup, the best trade-off be-
tween false positive, false negatives and overall accuracy.
With this architecture, we achieve around 98% overall accu-
racy, with about 7% false negatives and 3.3% false positives.
As discussed in Section 3.2, we expect that this performance
can further greatly be improved by searching for hyperpa-
rameters better fitting this use case. Overall, we thus val-
idate our hypothesis that a neural network based classifier
can successfully classify the DREBIN malware data set.
4.3 Adversarial Malware Crafting
We next apply the adversarial crafting algorithm de-
scribed in Section 3 and observe on how many occasions we
can successfully mislead our neural network based classifiers.
We quantify the performance of our algorithm through the
achieved misclassification rate, which measures the amount
of previously correctly classified malware that is misclassified
after the adversarial crafting. In addition, we also measure
the average number of modifications required to achieve the
measured misclassification rate to assess which architecture
provided a harder time being mislead. As discussed above,
allow at most 20 modification to any of the malware appli-
cations.
The performance results are listed in Table 4. As we can
see, we achieve misclassification rates from at least 50% in
the case of the two layer neural network with 200 and 10
neurons in each layer, to up to 84% in the case of the two
layer network with 10 neurons in both layers. Again, we
cannot directly observe any rule that directly connects net-
work architecture to resistance against adversarial crafting.
However, we can observe that the malware ratio used in the
training batches is correlated to the misclassification rate: a
higher malware ratio in general results in a lower misclassi-
fication rate, albeit with exceptions (e.g. in the case of the
2 layer network with 10 neurons in each).
Still, due to the fact that our algorithm is able to suc-
cessfully mislead most networks for a large majority of mal-
ware samples, we validate the hypothesis that our adversar-
ial crafting algorithm for malware can be used to mislead
neural network based malware detection systems.
4.4 Discussion
As our evaluation results show, adversarial sampling is a
real threat also for neural network based malware detection.
We therefore confirm that findings from applications in the
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Classifier MWR MR Distortion
[200] 0.4 81.89 11.52
[200] 0.5 79.37 11.92
[10, 10] 0.3 69.62 13.15
[10, 10] 0.4 55.88 16.12
[10, 10] 0.5 84.05 11.48
[10, 200] 0.3 75.47 12.89
[10, 200] 0.4 55.70 14.84
[10, 200] 0.5 57.19 14.96
[200, 10] 0.3 50.07 14.96
[200, 10] 0.4 35.31 17.79
[200, 10] 0.5 36.62 17.49
[100, 200] 0.4 74.93 12.87
[200, 100] 0.4 71.42 13.12
[200, 100] 0.5 73.02 12.98
[50, 50] 0.3 61.71 15.37
[50, 50] 0.4 60.02 14.7
[50, 50] 0.5 40.97 17.64
[50, 200] 0.3 79.25 11.61
[50, 200] 0.4 69.44 13.95
[50, 200] 0.5 64.66 15.16
[200, 50] 0.3 66.55 14.99
[200, 50] 0.4 58.31 15.76
[200, 50] 0.5 62.34 14.54
[200, 200] 0.1 78.28 10.99
[200, 200] 0.2 63.49 13.43
[200, 200] 0.3 63.08 14.52
[200, 200] 0.4 64.01 14.84
[200, 200] 0.5 69.35 13.47
[200, 300] 0.3 70.99 13.24
[200, 300] 0.4 61.91 14.19
[300, 200] 0.2 69.96 13.62
[300, 200] 0.4 63.51 14.01
[200, 200, 200] 0.1 75.41 10.50
[200, 200, 200] 0.4 71.31 13.08
[200, 200, 200, 200] 0.4 62.66 14.64
Table 4: Performance of our adversarial sampling
strategy. The misclassification rates (MR) and re-
quired average distortion (in number of added fea-
tures) with a threshold of 20 modifications are given
for various architectures and malware ratio (MWR).
domain of computer vision can successfully be transferred
to more security critical domains such as malware detection.
Despite heavy restrictions on the type of modifications we
are allowed to undertake, we are able to mislead our clas-
sifiers on about 60% to 80% of the malicious application
samples (depending on considered architecture and ignoring
corner cases). While this does not match the misclassifica-
tion rates of up to 97% for misclassifying images of digits
reported by Papernot et al. [17], a reduction in misclassifi-
cation performance was to be expected given the challenge
inherent to the malware detection domain.
In the next part of this paper, we are going to consider
possible defensive mechanisms to harden our neural network
against adversarial crafting. To ensure comparability, we
will restrict ourselves to the 200× 200 neurons architecture
for our neural network models (i.e. 2 layers with 200 neurons
each). It is trained with malware ratios between 0.3 and 0.5
for our subsequent evaluations, and we will use the networks
of the same architecture and with the same malwario rates
as our comparison baselines. In the above evaluations, this
configuration provides a reasonable trade-off between false
positive and false negative rates while retaining an overall
high accuracy. Furthermore, this architecture remains com-
paratively (outside of corner cases) resistant to adversarial
crafting, only being misled in about 64% of the cases while
at the same time requiring a comparatively large amount of
modifications.
5. DEFENSES
In this section, we investigate potential defensive mecha-
nisms for hardening our neural network-based malware de-
tector against adversarial crafting. We measure the effec-
tiveness of each these mechanisms by determining the re-
duction in misclassification rates, i.e. we determine the dif-
ference between the misclassification rates achieved against
regular networks, and those to which we applied the mech-
anisms. Again, as in the previous section, the misclassifi-
cation rate is defined as the percentage of malware samples
that are misclassified after the application of the adversarial
crafting algorithm, but were correctly classified before.
We first take a look at feature reduction as a potential
defensive mechanism: by reducing the number of features
we consider for classification, we hope to reduce the neu-
ral network’s sensitivity to changes in the input, as well as
reduce the number of feature options the adversary has for
distorting an application and causing a misclassification. We
consider simple feature reduction, a naive way to include fea-
tures based on where and how often they appear, as well as a
more involved feature reduction based on the mutual infor-
mation. Our goal is to evaluate whether feature reduction
in general can be used to harden a neural network against
adversarial crafting.
After looking at feature reduction, we consider two defen-
sive mechanisms already proposed in the literature: distilla-
tion, as introduced by Papernot et al. [18], and re-training
on adversarial samples, following methodology described by
Szegedy et al. [21].
5.1 Simple Feature Reduction
We first look at “simple” feature reduction: we manually
select features based on how they are expressed by the ap-
plications in our data set. We formulate these simple feature
reduction strategies through feature restrictions that we im-
pose on the feature set that we use for training our neural
networks.
The first feature restriction is that we train only on fea-
tures that are only expressed in the AnroidManifest.xml of
the applications’ APKs. Recall that, in the adversarial craft-
ing algorithm, we decided to only add features that appear
in the manifest to make sure that we do not interfere with
any functionality of the application in question. By restrict-
ing the training of our neural networks to manifest features
only, we focus the classifier on the features that we actually
change. We denote this feature restriction with manifest-
only. By applying manifestonly, we are left with 233727
of the original 545333 features that we use for training.
As the second feature restriction, we only consider fea-
tures that do not appear in the r largest feature classes. We
illustrate the cardinalities of our 8 feature classes in Table 1.
A large part of the features (over 50%) consist of URLs that
are mostly unique to each application, and would therefore
not help with separating benign from malicious applications.
Other features that appear in the largest feature classes show
similar behavior. With this feature restriction, which we call
onlysmall, we try to define a simple way to filter out all such
features. We instantiate onlysmall for r = 1 and 2, which
leaves us with 234845 and 49116 features, respectively, after
applying the feature restriction.
The last feature restriction that we consider is a variant of
onlysmall. With this restriction, we only consider features
that appear in at least r applications. We thereby directly
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Figure 2: Difference in misclassification rates for
the different simple feature reduction methods, with
regular networks as baseline. Negative values indi-
cate a higher misclassification rate, and therefore a
more susceptible network.
filter out features that do not consistently appear across
representatives of one target class, and will therefore not
be used to detect an application that belongs in them. We
call this feature restriction onlyfreq.
In effect, onlyfreq tries to achieve a similar goal as only-
small, however the set of restricted features is determined
differently. This is also reflected in the number of features
that remain after the applying the restriction: we instantiate
onlyfreq for r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, which leaves us with 177438,
95871, 60052 and 44942 features respectively.
5.1.1 Evaluation
We use all three simple feature reduction methods to train
new neural networks, each with 2 hidden layers and 200 neu-
rons on each layer. We then run our adversarial crafting
algorithm on each of these networks to determine how fre-
quently they are mislead by adversarial crafting. Figure 2
shows the difference between the original misclassification
rates we achieves on the regular networks and the misclassi-
fication rates we achieve for each feature reduction method.
This difference is evaluated at the different malware ratios
we used for training.
As we can see, the simple feature reduction generally
weakens the neural network against adversarial crafting. In
contrast to the about 62% misclassification rate we achieve
on the regular neural network, the misclassification rate goes
up to, in the worst case, 99% for the manifestonly feature
restriction. Most other neural networks trained under fea-
ture restrictions also show an increase of the misclassification
rate. While there are two exceptions, for instance under the
restriction onlyfreq with r = 1 where we reduce the mis-
classification rate by around 8%, these cannot be observed
consistently across architectures. We therefore leave them
as exceptions to the rule.
Overall, we can conclude that simple feature reduction is
not a suitable mechanism to harden your neural network
against adversarial crafting in the domain of malware detec-
tion.
5.2 Feature Reduction via Mutual Informa-
tion
Next, take a look at feature reduction using mutual infor-
mation, instead of taking the naive approach we described in
the previous section. We first briefly introduce the notion of
mutual information, before we then investigate its influence
on our networks’ resistance against adversarial crafting.
The mutual information I(X;Y ) of two random variables
X and Y is given by
I(X;Y ) =
∑
X,Y
p(x, y) log(
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
). (4)
Intuitively, the mutual information I(X;Y ) of two random
variables X and Y quantifies the statistical dependence be-
tween X and Y . We use this concept to identify features
in our data set that carry a large amount of information
with regard to our target classes. To select features using
mutual information, we compute it for each feature/target
class pair, i.e. we compute the mutual information I(X;Y ),
where X is the probability of a feature and Y the probability
of a target class. We then order all features by their mutual
information with the target classes and we pick the n highest
of them. If we encounter a tie, we include all features with
that same mutual information (and thus obtain a number
of features slightly bigger than n). We finally use the set of
features determined by this process to train new classifiers
and evaluate their resistance against adversarial crafting.
Consider that there is a second approach, which we also
investigate. Given that a feature has a high value in mutual
information, we also assume that its influence on the classifi-
cation is high. We will thus train a classifier only on feature
sets that contain many but equally important features and
observe the misclassification rates.To do so, we inverse the
ranking from the first experiment and consider with n the n
lowest values of mutual information and their corresponding
features.
There are few features with a high value of mutual infor-
mation and many with a low value. As a consequence, the
second approach will yield much bigger datasets to train on
then the first.
5.2.1 Evaluation first Approach
In this approach we rank after the importance of features
given MI. We trained several new neural networks for vary-
ing values of n, ranging from n = 50 to n = 2000. Each
of these networks use the standard architecture (i.e. 2 hid-
den layers with 200 neurons each) and are trained with a
50% malware ratio during training. We then applied the
adversarial crafting algorithm described in Section 3.3 to
determine their susceptibility to the attack.
Our evaluation results are presented in Figure 3. It shows
the development of false negative rates (at accuracy > 93%),
misclassification rates and average required distortion for an
increasing amount of features selected through the mutual
information method described above. As a point of compari-
son, we provide the performance values of the regular neural
network with feature reduction as horizontal lines (i.e. 7%
false negatives, 62% misclassification rate and an average
distortion of around 15).
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Figure 3: Success of adversarial crafting against clas-
sifiers trained under feature reduction using mutual
information. Given are false negative rates, mis-
classification rates and average distortion on each of
these networks at mutual information level n. All
networks have shape [200,200] and are trained with
a malware ratio of 0.5. The constant values are the
corresponding rates of the original model.
For very small n < 250, we experience very poor clas-
sification performance and therefore ignore those cases in
our evaluation. For the other cases, performance is in gen-
eral worse than in the regular case. For n ≤ 1600, we only
achieve about 7% false negative rates in the classification,
and the adversarial crafting algorithm is successful in at least
70% of the cases, requiring a smaller average distortion of
12.5.
For 1500 < n < 1900, we observe a peak where our newly
trained networks achieve nearly the same performance as our
regular networks: the false negative rate is around 7% and
the misclassification rate also goes down to about 60% for
n = 1700. The required average distortion, however remains
low at at most 14. The misclassification rates differ however
strongly for the similar models.
5.2.2 Evaluation second Approach
We again trained several networks on different values of
n, where n however now starts with the tied, low ranked
features. For very low n, we observe that the network is very
vulnerable to adversarial samples, having a misclassification
rate of over 90%.
The false negative and accuracy rates are, however, in
general comparable with the original model trained on the
full data. The general misclassification rate decreases with
more features and varies between 70.1% for n = 1050 and
87.6% for n = 800, average is 82%. This is much worse than
the original model.
5.2.3 Discussion
As in the previous section, our findings indicate that us-
ing less features does not necessarily make the adversarial
crafting harder. It seems that few numbers features lead
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Figure 4: Success of adversarial crafting against clas-
sifiers trained under feature reduction using mutual
information in reversed order. Given are false nega-
tive rates, misclassification rates and average distor-
tion on each of these networks at mutual information
level n. All networks have shape [200,200] and are
trained with a malware ratio of 0.5. The constant
values are the corresponding rates of the original
model.
to easy perturbations, since each single feature has a much
higher impact for classifying an application. By using fea-
ture reduction based on mutual information, we thus make
our network even more susceptible against adversarial craft-
ing.
In the case of selecting the most important features, how-
ever, there are some cases where the trained model is less
prone to adversarial samples. Hence, we do not want to ex-
clude the possibility of improving resistance against adver-
sarial crafting using feature reduction: a more fine-grained
analysis could lead to positive results that we leave for future
work.
5.3 Distillation
We next take a look at distillation. While distillation was
originally proposed by Hinton et al. [10] as as a way to trans-
fer knowledge from large neural networks to a smaller ones,
Papernot at al. [18] recently proposed using it as a defensive
mechanism against adversarial crafting as well.
The basic idea behind distillation is the following: assume
that we already have a neural network F that classifies a
training data set X into the target classes Y and produces
as output a probability distribution over Y (e.g. by using
a final softmax layer we already introduced in Section 3.2).
Further, assume that we want to train a second neural net-
work F′ on the same data set X that achieves the same (or
even better) performance. Now, instead of using the target
class labels that come with the data set, we use the output
F(X) of the network F as the label of X ∈ X to train F′.
The output produced by F will not assign a unique label
Y ∈ Y to X, but instead a probability distribution over Y.
The new labels therefore contain more information about the
9
membership of X to the different target classes, compared
to a simple label that just chooses the most likely class.
Papernot et al. [18] motivate the use of distillation as a
defensive mechanism through its capability to improve the
second networks generalization performance (i.e. classifica-
tion performance on samples outside the training data set).
Thus, instead of using distillation to train a second smaller
network like was proposed in [10], they use the output of the
first neural network F to train a second neural network F′
with exactly the same architecture.
An important detail in the distillation process is the slight
modification of the final softmax layer (cf. Equation 3) in
the original network F: instead of the regular softmax nor-
malization, we use
Fi(X) = (
ezi(x)/T∑|Y|
l=1 e
zl(x)/T
), (5)
where T is a distillation parameter called temperature. For
T = 1, we obtain the regular softmax normalization that we
already used for the training in Section 3.2. If T is large, the
output probabilities approach a more uniform distribution,
whereas for small T , the output of F will be less so. To
achieve a good distillation result, we use the output of the
original network F produced at a high temperature T and
use it as class labels to train the new network F′.
The overall procedure for hardening our classifier against
adversarial crafting can thus be summarized in the following
three steps.
1. Given the original classifier F and the samples X , con-
struct a new training data set D = {(X,F(X)) | X ∈
X} that is labeled with F’s output at high tempera-
ture.
2. Construct a new neural network F′ with the same ar-
chitecture as F.
3. Train F′ on D.
Note that both step two and step three are performed under
the same high temperature T to achieve a good distillation
performance.
We next apply the above procedure on our originally
trained classifiers and examine the impact of distillation as
a defensive mechanism against adversarial crafting in the
domain of malware detection.
5.3.1 Evaluation
Figure 5 shows the effects of distillation on misclassifica-
tion compared to the original models. We observe a general,
strong increase of the false negative rate, and a slight in-
crease in the false positive rate. For ratio 0.5, it raises from
4 to 6.4, whereas for 0.3, it is equivalent. Due to the large
size of the benign class, the accuracy only ranges in between
93-95%.
On the other hand, we observe that the misclassification
rate drops significantly, in some cases to 38.5% for ratio 0.4.
The difference in the average number of perturbed features,
however, is rather small. The number of perturbed features
is 14 for ratio 0.3 to 16 for the other two.
Using distillation, we can strengthen the neural network
against adversarial samples. However, the misclassification
rates are still around 40% and thus rather high. Addition-
ally, we pay this robustness with a less good classifier. The
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Figure 5: False negative rates, misclassification rates
and average required distortions after applying dis-
tillation to the networks networks with 200 neurons
on 2 layers each. Given are the differences of each
measure to the original network’s performance. A
positive value is thus an improvement for FNR and
misclassification rate, value for average distortion
should be negative.
effect is further not as strong as on computer vision data.
Papernot et al. [18] reported rates around 5% after distilla-
tion for images. Further research should investigate whether
distillation can be adapted to malware data or discrete,
sparse and unbalanced data in general. Also the question
remains which properties (or combinations thereof) influ-
ence the obtained improvement in terms of misclassification
rates.
5.4 Re-Training
As the last countermeasure, we try re-training our clas-
sifier with adversarially crafted samples. This method was
originally proposed by Szegedy at al. [21] and involves the
following steps:
1. Train the classifier F on original data set D = B ∪M ,
whereB is the set of benign, andM the set of malicious
applications
2. Craft adversarial samples A for F using the forward
gradient method described in Section 3.3
3. Iterate additional training epochs on F with the ad-
versarial samples from the last step as additional, ma-
licious samples.
By re-training, we aim at improving the generalization per-
formance of F, i.e. improve the classification performance
of F on samples outside our training set. A good generaliza-
tion performance generally makes a classifier less sensitive
to small perturbations, and therefore also more resilient to
adversarial crafting.
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5.4.1 Evaluation
We applied the above mechanism to the regular networks
with 200 neurons on 2 layers each that we have been con-
sider throughout this section. We continued their training
on n1 = 20, n2 = 100 and n3 = 250 additional, adversarially
crafted malware samples. We combined the adversarial sam-
ples to create training batches by mixing them with benign
samples at each network’s malware ratio. We then trained
the network for one more epoch on one training batch and
re-evaluated their susceptibility against adversarial crafting.
Figure 6 illustrates the performance (in false negative
rate) of the re-trained networks and the misclassification
performance Algorithm 1 achieved on them (in misclassi-
fication rate and average required distortion). We grouped
networks by their malware ratio during training and give as
comparison the performance values of the original networks
before re-training.
For the network trained with malware ratio 0.3 and 0.4,
we can observe a reduction of the misclassification rate, and
an increase of the required average distortion for n1 and
n2 additional training samples. For instance, we achieve
a misclassification rate of 67% for the network trained with
100 additional samples at 0.3 malware ratio, down from 73%
for the original network. A further increase of the adversarial
training samples used for re-training, however, causes the
misclassification rate to increase again, reaching up to 79%
for both malware ratios.
For the last networks, trained with malware ratio 0.5, the
misclassification rate only decreases if we use 250 adversarial
training samples. Here, we reach 68% misclassification rate,
down from 69% for the original network. For fewer amount
of adversarial samples for re-training, the misclassification
rate remains very similar to the original case. It seems that
the network trained with 0.5 malware ratio is fitting very
close to the malware samples it was trained on, and therefore
requires more adversarial samples to generalize and improve
its resistance against adversarial crafting.
Overall, we can conclude that simple re-training on ad-
versarially crafted malware samples does improve the neu-
ral network’s resistance against adversarial crafting. The
number of adversarial samples required to improve the resis-
tance depend heavily on the training parameters we chose for
training the original networks. However, choosing too many
may also further degrade the network’s resistance against
adversarial crafting.
5.4.2 Discussion
In our evaluation above, we only considered one iteration
of adversarial re-training. Ideally, the above method is con-
tinuously applied, by computing new adversarial samples for
each newly generated network F′. These samples are then
fed back to re-train F′ and generate a new network more
resistant against adversarial crafting.
Goodfellow et al. [7] propose an alternative approach to
the general idea of adversarial re-training: instead of train-
ing on actually crafted adversarial samples, they formulate
an adversarial loss function that incorporates the possibility
of adversarial crafting through perturbations in direction of
the network’s gradient. This allows them to continuously in-
corporate adversarially crafted samples during training with
an infinite supply thereof. We think that this approach
should further be investigated also in security critical do-
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Figure 6: Misclassification rates, false negative rates
and average required distortion achieved on re-
trained networks. Regular network’s performance
is given as baseline, indicated by horizontal lines.
mains, and consider this a promising direction for future
work.
5.5 Summary of Results
We considered four potential defensive mechanisms and
evaluated their impact on a neural networks susceptibility
against adversarial crafting. Feature reduction, both sim-
ple as well through mutual information, usually make the
neural network weaker against adversarial crafting. Having
less features of greater importance makes it easier to craft
adversarial samples. This is caused by the larger impact
each feature has on the output distribution of the network.
At this point we cannot recommend feature reduction as
a defensive mechanism. Future work will have to identify,
potentially more involved, feature reduction methods that
actually increase a network’s resistance against adversarial
crafting.
We also investigated distillation and re-training, which
were both originally proposed as defensive mechanism
against adversarial crafting in the computer vision domain.
Distillation does have a positive effect, but does not per-
form as well as in the computer vision domain. The rea-
sons for this have to be investigated in future work. Simple
re-training achieved consistent reduction of misclassification
rates across different networks. However, choosing the right
amount of adversarial training samples has a significant im-
pact on this reduction. Iteratively applying re-training to a
network might further improve the network’s resistance.
6. RELATED WORK
The following discussion of related work complements the
references included in Section 2.
Security of Machine Learning is an active research area.
Barreno et al. [2] give a broad overview of attacks against
machine learning systems. They discriminate between ex-
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ploratory attacks at test time or causative attacks that in-
fluence the training data to obtain the desired result. Ad-
versarial samples, as used here, are employed at test time.
Previous work showed that adversarial samples can be con-
structed for different algorithms and also generalize between
machine learning techniques in many cases [7, 16, 21].
Gu et al. [9] claim that adversarial samples are mainly a
product of the way feed-forward neural networks are trained
and optimized. As a solution they propose deep contractive
networks, which are however harder to optimize. These net-
works include a layer wise penalty which furthermore limits
their capacity.
Goodfellow at al. [7] proposed a linear explanation to the
existence of adversarial samples. In their intuition, adversar-
ial samples are not due to the overall non-linearity of neural
networks, but to the linearity of their underlying compo-
nents. Consequently, they show that adversarial samples
generalize to other linear models, such as for example logis-
tic regression. In contrast to those models, neural networks
are however able to be hardened against adversarial samples.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigated the viability of adversarial
crafting against neural networks in domains different from
computer vision. Through our evaluation on the DREBIN
data set, we were able to show that adversarial crafting is
indeed a real threat in security critical domains such as mal-
ware detection as well: we achieved misclassification rates
of up to 80% against neural network based classifiers that
achieve classification performance on par with state of the
art classifiers from the literature.
As a second contribution, we examined four potential
defensive mechanisms for hardening our neural networks
against adversarial crafting. Our evaluations of these mech-
anisms showed the following: first, feature reduction, a pop-
ular method to reduce input complexity and simplify the
training of the classifier, generally makes the neural network
weaker against adversarial crafting. Second, distillation does
improve misclassification rates, but does not decrease them
as strongly as observed in computer vision settings. Third,
re-training on adversarially crafted samples achieves consis-
tent reduction of misclassification rates across architectures.
Future work should more carefully examine the defensive
mechanisms that we identified as potentially helpful For ex-
ample in addition to distillation, Goodfellow et al.’s [7] idea
of using an adversarial loss functions during training should
be more carefully examined in security relevant domains.
The applicability of adversarial crafting attacks to addi-
tional domains should also be studied. It could direct re-
searchers towards more effective defensive mechanisms.
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